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Abstract: A Regional strategy with three essential elements is needed to defeat ISIS. The first involves rolling it back in Iraq and Syria
by attacking its capabilities and strategies. The second is to contain
it by helping fortify weaker Arab countries that might be at risk. The
third is to influence the relationships between Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Jordan, and Iran, countries whose efforts will be required to defeat
ISIS and end the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

O

n the eve of the 13th anniversary of the horrific 9/11 attacks,
President Barack Obama delivered a primetime televised speech
in which he identified the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL,
also widely known as ISIS) as a significant threat to the United States,
its allies and the overall stability of the Middle East. He also articulated
several pillars of a counterterrorism strategy to “degrade, and ultimately
destroy ISIL.”1
ISIS represents a threat with three different faces. To the United
States and its western allies, it is a terrorist organization. However, for
Arab states, ISIS represents an insurgency without political boundaries
that threatens the survival of countries [such as Iraq, Syria and Libya]
in the midst of civil wars, puts at risk weak states desperately trying to
avert civil war, like Lebanon and Jordan; and poses a challenge to the
legitimacy of even stronger states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. When
examined from a regional perspective, ISIS represents the spearhead of
a broader movement threatening to sunder the Arab political order that
has existed since the end of World War I, and potentially threatening
non-Arab states such as Iran, Turkey and even Israel.
Any strategy to eradicate ISIS must take into account the threat’s
three essential aspects. To deal with it, the United States will need the
capability to fight ISIS using military means, but also to strengthen the
military and political capacity of individual Arab states at risk. Moreover,
it will need to move beyond country-specific approaches towards a
regional effort to manage the relationships between competing powers,
such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, all of which have contributed to
the instability that has allowed ISIS to flourish.

The Nature of the Threat

In the wake of 9/11, the US Department of Defense greatly
increased its capacity for dealing with asymmetric threats such as alQaeda. United States Special Operations Command, and under it, Joint
Special Operations Command, along with other parts of the military,
1      Statement by the President on ISIL, Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 10, 2014.
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have enhanced detection, surveillance and response capabilities against
non-state opponents. However, ISIS is a hybrid organization. It uses a
combination of terrorist and conventional military tactics and, atypical
for asymmetric opponents, it holds large swaths of territory (in Syria and
Iraq) over which it has imposed sovereignty.
Other unique aspects of ISIS could bedevil the United States and
its coalition partners. First, US-led military operations against ISIS are
taking place against the backdrop of civil wars in Syria and Iraq, with
the additional complication that ISIS has conflated these conflicts by
essentially erasing many of the border areas separating these countries.
Military operations taking place within the context of two civil wars
are likely to be fraught with unprecedented degrees of complexity.
Unfortunately, military operations cannot be sealed off completely from
the civil wars; and unintended consequences from these operations
could exacerbate the conflicts and inadvertently strengthen opponents
the United States has vowed to undermine. For example, the air battle
now raging against ISIS in Syria in support of the Kurds could very well
reinforce the Assad regime which President Obama claimed in 2011
must be replaced.2
Second, the US government may think it is battling only ISIS, but
the threat comes from a broader political movement which military
means alone cannot defeat.3 Reducing western influence in the region,
upending what is perceived by some to be an oppressive order in the
Arab world, and erasing artificially imposed boundaries between Syria,
Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon transcend ISIS’s battles in Iraq and Syria.
These efforts have broader mainstream appeal, even among those who
abhor ISIS’s brutal methods.
Third, we are not just facing a threat from ISIS, but a proliferation
of jihadist groups with shifting coalitions. The new al-Qaeda elite group
Khorasan has now aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra, another al-Qaeda affiliate.4 Rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaeda could result in new coalitions
and even new groups. Beyond the Middle East, groups like Boko Haram
in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia have established strongholds from
which to attack local populations and US interests. Defeating ISIS may
be necessary, but insufficient for eliminating the threat to the United
States, and its allies in the region. In fact, the consequence of defeating
ISIS may be the strengthening of other groups, the spawning of new
ones, or the formation of new formidable coalitions between existing
groups.5
Some Pundits argue the threat from ISIS is exaggerated, as the
group has too many internal conflicts and external enemies for it to

2      Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama says,” The Washington Post, August
18, 2011.
3     Michael Ryan, “Al-Qa’ida: Time to Engage the Deep Battle,” Middle East Institute, August 2,
2013, where he insightfully describes Al-Qa’ida as a movement, not merely an organization. This
insight can also be applied to the case of ISIS.
4      Dina Temple-Raston, “Al-Qa’ida Reasserts Itself with Khorasan Group,” NPR Radio, October
3, 2014.
5      See Ross Harrison, “Defeating the Islamic State Militarily is Only Half the Battle,” The Middle
East Institute, October 3, 2014.
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sustain itself.6 There is some validity to this claim. The leadership consists of both religious ideologues and those from more secular, Ba’athist
party backgrounds. A potential exists, therefore, for a split between
the various factions, particularly as the group comes under increased
pressure from the military coalition arrayed against it. Moreover, the
assumption a sustainable polity can be built on a jihadist Sunni Islamic
identity has yet to be proven, not to mention the dangers of overextension should ISIS advance and try to expand its boundaries further.
While the Islamic State could prove vulnerable over time, in the
short to medium term it can continue to wreak havoc, destroy lives,
sunder communities and make it more difficult for Syria and Iraq to
emerge from their civil wars intact. The United States cannot afford to
assume ISIS will somehow extinguish itself in time to save the Middle
East from even more destruction and instability.
Confronting ISIS requires military responses in Iraq and Syria
which the United States is now leading, but they must be wrapped in a
broader regional strategy. This regional strategy should include efforts
to strengthen the military and political capacities of Arab states, such
as Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. It should also include a regional level
initiative to secure cooperation between major powers, namely Saudi
Arabia, Turkey and Iran to resolve the bloody civil conflicts in Syria and
Iraq that feed ISIS. This regional strategy also requires military efforts
by the Defense Department be reinforced by coordination with the State
Department and other agencies within the executive branch. Absent this
coordination, military actions alone are unlikely to be effective.

The Military Response

In the initial stages of the military campaign it appears the attacks
against ISIS have been tactically successful. With help from Kurdish
spotters and the Iraqi military the campaign has protected the Yazidis
stranded on Mount Sinjar. The campaign has also fortified the Kurdish
Peshmerga in its fight against ISIS, preventing the fall of Erbil. Thus far
it has also helped thwart ISIS’s attempts to overrun Syrian Kurdistan,
in particular the town of Kobani on the Turkish border. Airstrikes in
Iraq have also dislodged ISIS from the Mosul dam area, and spared large
areas of Iraq, including Baghdad, from the threat of flooding.
It appears the focus of the military campaign has been to degrade
ISIS’s capability, attacking what is believed to be its base in Raqqa, Syria,
and slowing down and even rolling back its advances in Iraq. Early successes notwithstanding, the military campaign is not being waged on
an inanimate object, but against a savvy, sophisticated, albeit brutal,
opponent. ISIS will likely adjust its strategy to the tactics used against
it. Even before the American-led coalition commenced operations, ISIS
dispersed its forces and resources, apparently in an attempt to avoid
exposing its center of gravity to attacks capable of throwing it off balance.
In addition to compromising ISIS’s capability, it is also critical for
the United States to ascertain its strategy and devise plans to disrupt it. It
is important to understand ISIS’s strategy for Iraq is very different from

6      For an example see Steven Simon, “Who Will Win in Iraq?: ISIS Will Fail in Iraq, and Iran
Will Be the Victor, The New York Times, June 16, 2014 and “Why ISIS is Not al-Qaida” MSNBC,
September 11, 2014.
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its Syrian strategy, defying a one-size-fits-all military approach. In Syria,
ISIS is using a “direct competitive strategy,” simultaneously attempting
to outmaneuver other jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra, the weaker secular groups which until now have been receiving modest US assistance, and the Assad regime.7 It has taken advantage
of the splintering of political and militia groups that occurred over
the course of the civil war. ISIS has also flourished due to its ability
to combine brute force with the skillful use of modern technology to
attract recruits. Moreover, it has advanced because of its prudent use of
resources such as, earning revenue by selling oil to the Assad government, as well as to Turkey via the black market.
Within this competitive game, the relationship between ISIS and
the Assad regime is ambiguous, perhaps even symbiotic. At one level
they are sworn enemies; at another level they derive some benefit from
each other. ISIS benefits from Assad’s assault on competitive rebel
groups, while the Syrian regime benefits from the presence of ISIS by
being able to position itself as the only force capable of preventing an
Islamic terrorist takeover, something it artfully uses to justify its brutal
methods over both secular and Islamic rebel groups.
In Iraq, ISIS’s strategy is quite different. It involves less a direct
competitive strategy against the Shi’i-led Iraqi government in Baghdad,
and more a weakening of the government “indirectly” by increasing the
intensity of sectarian violence between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’i, creating
chaos and turmoil throughout the country and turning disenfranchised
Sunnis into recruits.8 In other words, while the ultimate goal of ISIS in
Iraq may be to topple the government in Baghdad, it is trying first to
marginalize it and challenge its legitimacy before attacking it directly.
By turning up the heat of the civil conflict, it weakens the government,
creating a political vacuum and a opportunity for growth. This approach
allowed it to expand into Sunni strongholds such as Anbar almost
unopposed.9
The United States and its coalition partners need to take these differences in ISIS’s strategy into account. In Iraq, the challenge is inherently
more political than it is in Syria. The key in Iraq is to try to disrupt ISIS’s
indirect strategy by working, not just to increase the Iraqi government’s
military capacity, which according to retired General John R. Allen,
coordinating the international coalition, could take up to a year, but
also its political capacity.10 It may be too late to woo Sunni tribal leaders
and former Iraqi military officers back into the fold of the government,
but some positive developments could open up a pathway for increasing
the political and military capacity of the Iraqi government. The new
government in Baghdad, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, seems
to be willing to govern more inclusively, notwithstanding the fact that,
like former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, he comes from the Shi’i
Dawa party. Another hopeful factor is that the major regional players
7      Ross Harrison, Strategic Thinking in 3D: A guide for National Security, Foreign Policy and Business
Professionals (Potomac Books, 2013), chapter 4 for an analysis of direct strategies.
8      Ibid., chapter 3 for an analysis of indirect strategies.
9      Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Force Captures Fallujah amid Rise of Violence in Iraq,” Washington Post,
January 3, 2014. The Islamic State was an Al-Qaeda force until Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader
of al-Qa’ida disavowed the group, throwing its support to the al-Nusra Front instead.
10      Kirk Semple, “Coalition Leader Warns of Long Fight Against ISIS in Iraq,” The New York
Times, October 3, 2014.
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coalescing around the new prime minister seem to be Saudi Arabia,
Iran, and the United States are working towards increasing the political
capacity of the Iraqi government to help break the momentum of an
ISIS advance.11 In order to build momentum, the United States needs to
continue to play a strong lead role.
In Syria, US strategy is unclear and seems to be limited to using air
power. The problem with this approach is the secular rebel groups vetted
by the United States are divided, weak, and unlikely to be an effective
fighting force on the ground to augment US-led operations from the
air. Since President Obama has pledged no “boots on the ground,” the
US military has little choice but to continue to train and support these
rebels. The United States must also ramp up support for the Kurds, who
have proven to be more reliable and viable fighting forces against ISIS.
Ultimately, the Obama administration must develop a cogent strategy for how to deal with the Assad government. An undefined strategy is
not problematic in the early phases of an operation, but over time it will
need to be clearer, particularly if attacking ISIS and other jihadist rebel
groups emboldens the Assad regime to launch more brutal attacks on
the very secular rebels the United States needs in the fight against ISIS.
The Obama administration may be faced with the reality that the Assad
regime may be the only viable force for fighting ISIS from the ground.
Since the administration has been clear it will not cooperate with the
Assad government, US policymakers will likely face a dilemma.
In addition to such external challenges, the United States has a difficult organizational task ahead. Compounding the challenge of disrupting
ISIS in two different theaters of war, managing the coalition of over
60 countries will likely become increasingly unwieldy over time. While
only a handful of these countries are actively involved in the US-led air
campaign, coordination will become more difficult, as interests between
the United States, its Arab, non-Arab, and even its Western allies start to
diverge. As military campaigns wax and wane, it is likely the domestic
politics in each country will put strains on the coalition.
What should the United States do to plan for this contingency? First,
there needs to be a “whole of government” approach to the conflict.
Managing the coalition will require unprecedented degrees of collaboration between the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the
intelligence community. Second, the United States must have the capability to manage more transactional, issue-specific coalitions as opposed
to the firmer alliances of the Cold War. Turkey is an example. Although a
fellow NATO member, it has been a reticent ally on many issues, including ISIS. Due to domestic considerations involving the Kurds, issues
with Syrian refugees, and the fact ISIS held hostage 49 of its diplomats,
the country was reluctant to join the coalition until recently. Finally,
on October 2, 2014, the Turkish Parliament authorized the military to
engage. Tensions will need to be managed, particularly since Turkey
has pushed for attacks on the Assad regime, while the United States at
least for now is limiting its focus to ISIS. This is just one example of the
complexity of managing relationships with coalition partners.
11      Michael Georgy and Ahmed Rasheed, “U.S. Ready to Help New Iraq Leader, Iran Weclomes
Choice,” Reuters, August 13, 2014.
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Containing the Spread of ISIS

ISIS poses not only a military challenge to Iraq and Syria, and a
terrorist threat to the United States, but also strains the legitimacy of
political boundaries of the region, potentially posing threats to Lebanon,
Jordan and even Egypt. While these governments have to develop their
own political response to ISIS, the United States can help prevent ISIS’s
military and terrorist expansion into these states. Efforts should be tailored to the needs of each state, complementing the ongoing military
campaigns against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Jordan, part of the US-led coalition, has already faced pressure from
its own Muslim Brotherhood, which is opposed to the government’s
role in air raids in Syria and Iraq. This speaks to the fact that the biggest
threat to Jordan from ISIS is not from across its borders, which are
protected by a well equipped and trained military, but from within. The
threat of an ISIS cell forming within the country is a possibility for
which the Jordanian government needs to prepare. One of the major
challenges in terms of government capacity is the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan is outstripping its resources and infrastructure. More aid
from the United States and Gulf Arab states will be needed, in addition
to the $300 million the United States already gives to the Jordanian
military annually.12
While ISIS has limited capacity to challenge the borders of Egypt,
it could attack the regime from within through disaffected cells of
the Muslim Brotherhood. In the wake of the overthrow of President
Mohammed Morsi in 2013, Egyptian government forces killed over
a thousand protesters from the Brotherhood, driving its leaders and
followers underground. ISIS could penetrate the more radical factions
within the Brotherhood, or directly infiltrate Egypt through the lightly
defended Sinai Peninsula, creating convenient beachheads from which
to attack the regime.13
For now, Egypt has the means to defend itself against attacks from
ISIS. The Egyptian military is capable and well trained. It appears to
have wide support from the Egyptian people, and President el-Sisi seems
to be popular, at least among secular groups.
That said, the political response necessary to avert an advance
by ISIS would be a slow but deliberate rehabilitation of the Muslim
Brotherhood into the political realm. Egypt will be better able to thwart
attempts by ISIS (and other jihadist groups) to threaten the country if
the Brotherhood is part of the opposition, rather than underground
where it can plan attacks on the regime with ISIS.
The United States has limited immediate leverage with which to
influence Egypt on this issue, particularly since Egypt’s main financier,
Saudi Arabia, shares el-Sisi’s contempt for the Brotherhood. However,
with some persuasion and economic incentives, el-Sisi may conclude the
threat from jihadist groups demands a change in his position regarding
the Brotherhood.

12      David Schenker, “Countering the ISIS Threat to Jordan,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2014.
13      “Reining in Egypt’s Military Aid,” editorial, The New York Times, October 4, 2014.
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The country that has little wherewithal for defending itself militarily
or even politically is Lebanon. It has been rattled by years of civil war
in Syria, and controversy over Hezbollah’s involvement in that war on
the side of the Assad regime. Also, it is internally fragile, and has been
destabilized by the large number of refugees from Syria who now reside
in the country. It has already suffered the savagery of ISIS. During this
past summer the Lebanese town of Arsal was briefly occupied by ISIS,
and more recently it was reported that several Lebanese Army officers
were beheaded.14
Since Lebanon lacks the infrastructure and internal cohesion to
defend itself, and is the weakest link in the chain of vulnerable Arab
countries, it needs help from the outside. What can the United States
and others do? The United States has already given the Lebanese Army,
an institution which presently has broad based respect in the country,
an emergency infusion of weapons.15 Moreover, in early 2014 the Saudis
gave the Lebanese Army a $3 billion subvention.16 More stunning even,
the Iranian National Security Council announced in September it would
award a grant to the Lebanese Army.17 The United States can work with
the Saudis and Lebanese Army to make sure these resources are best
deployed. It could also work with the Saudis and other Gulf Arab states
towards increasing support for Lebanon’s security sector.
As much as the United States and its international and regional
partners can help Arab governments increase their internal capacities
to thwart the expansionist efforts of ISIS, there are limits to what can
be done by outsiders. The main impetus for defensive political action
against ISIS must come from the Arab states themselves. While the
United States can provide military and other forms of assistance, it can
not completely inoculate the Arab world from the effects of ISIS. The
efforts of the United States need to be augmented by political action on
the part of governments in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon towards building legitimate institutions and political processes. Without political
will and adequate responses from the Arab states, US aid is likely to be
ineffective.
Another thing the United States cannot and should not attempt to
do is play a role in the question of political identity in the Arab world.
ISIS has raised the stakes by subordinating tribal, ethnic and Arab
identities under a jihadist variant of Sunni Islamic identity. Questions
regarding state-based Iraqi and Syrian identities and the sectarian
divides between Sunni and Shi’i can only be addressed by Iraqis and
Syrians. Also, whether an underlying Arab nationalism, which seemed
fleetingly apparent during the headier days of the Arab Spring, can be a
unifying force is something only Arab leaders and their constituents can
answer. Failure to address the question of political identity in the Arab
world could mean leaving it to ISIS and the broader jihadist movement
to answer.
14      Hwaida Saad and Rick Gladstone, “Border Fighting Intensifies between ISIS and Lebanon,”
The New York Times, and “ISIS Executes Second Lebanese Soldier,” The Daily Star, September 7, 2014.
15      Diaa Hadid, “US Delivers Military Aid to the Lebanese Military,” Time Magazine, August 29,
2014.
16      Anne Barnard, “Saudi’s Grant to Lebanon See as Message to US,” The New York Times,
January 6, 2014.
17      “Iran to Give Military Grant to Lebanese Army: Official,” Reuters, September 30, 2014.
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However, the United States can play a critical role. In addition to
increasing their defensive capabilities and nudging them towards political inclusion, the United States should encourage its Arab partners to
engage politically on issues related to Iraq and Syria. As the Syrian and
Iraqi civil wars evolve, there will be non-Arab stakeholders, namely
Turkey and Iran, involved in trying to shape governments in these two
countries, or even dealing with border realignment. It will be necessary
for an Arab bloc, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, to have a seat at the table. The United States should use its
convening capacity to facilitate.

Forging Regional Cooperation

While Saudi Arabia and Iran seem to be in agreement on some
issues regarding Iraq and ISIS, this development is recent. The civil
wars in Syria and Iraq which spawned the formation of ISIS were fueled
by proxy conflicts between these same regional powers. Saudi Arabia,
which has backed Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime, waged a
proxy battle against Iran, which backed Assad. This dynamic extended
to Iraq as well, where Iran was a benefactor of former Prime Minister
Malaki, and his Shi’i Dawa party, while Saudi Arabia lent support to
many of the Sunni rebel groups who were in opposition, some now
aligned with ISIS.
Since these civil conflicts have escalated, and spawned destructive groups like ISIS, Iran and Saudi Arabia appear to be working in
tandem, or at least no longer at cross purposes. Both countries, along
with the United States, “encouraged” former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Malaki to step down and gave early support to his replacement, Prime
Minister Abadi. Iran went so far as sending its own Quds force of the
Revolutionary Guard Corps to Iraq to help fight against ISIS. Also,
Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister visited Saudi Arabia in August of 2014 to
discuss with the Saudi Foreign Minister threats to regional security, like
the rise of ISIS and the growing instability in Iraq and Syria.18 Moreover,
Iran seems to have tacitly accepted US airstrikes in Syria, as long as the
regime of President Assad is not targeted. Further collaboration between
the major powers of the region will be necessary to stabilize Iraq and
Syria and defeat ISIS.
The cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia is informal, and
still deep-seated animosities persist. Thus, joint efforts to subdue the
civil wars in Iraq and Syria could prove fleeting. The Syrian and Iraqi
conflicts are already shifting the distribution of power between Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, potentially straining cooperation. A
collapse or further weakening of Syria and Iraq could attenuate Iran’s
sphere of influence, specifically threatening to truncate the Shi’i arc that
extends from Tehran through Damascus and to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In other words, the strategic windfall Tehran experienced with the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime could now become a strategic liability.
The longstanding airtight alliance between Iran and Syria may be fraying
as well, despite Iran’s stated commitment to the survival of the Assad

18     “Iran Deputy Foreign Minister to Visit Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, August 25, 2014.
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regime.19 While this could reduce Iran’s ability to meddle and increase
its willingness to play a constructive role, such a challenge to its regional
preeminence could instead raise the perception of threat in Tehran,
making it more, not less, recalcitrant with respect to Iraq and Syria.
While Iran’s position as a regional power could be undermined by
the havoc in Syria and Iraq, Egypt’s star could be set to rise. Egypt’s relative standing in the region is likely to increase given the power vacuum
in Iraq and Syria, and el-Sisi’s cautious yet clear desire to play a regional
role. While still economically hobbled, Egypt has already taken the
lead in negotiating the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, and joined
with the United Arab Emirates in attacking Islamic militants in Libya.20
Egypt’s regional involvement, particularly when backed by Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf Arab states, could cause jitters in Tehran, making future
cooperation on tackling ISIS more difficult.
During this period of instability, the United States should influence
relationships between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, with the
goal of keeping cooperation from being derailed. The United States is
in a unique position to manage some of the rough spots that could arise
from changes in the distribution of power in the region, enhanced by
the clout it derives from being the head of the military coalition in the
battle against ISIS. This role becomes easier once there is more clarity
on the nuclear issue with Iran. Nonetheless, the threat that ISIS poses
to the region creates an opportunity for collaboration between Turkey,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. If successful, the resultant cooperation
between these countries could greatly contribute to defusing the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and prove an effective regional challenge to ISIS.21
Skeptics of the United States ability to cool regional tensions should
remember the acrimony between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while deepseated and historical, did not develop in a geopolitical vacuum. Past US
policies exacerbated the tensions between the major regional powers
in recent years. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the toppling of
Saddam Hussein, created a vacuum through which Iran almost effortlessly projected power into the Arab world, a development that directly
challenged Riyadh’s regional ambitions. Later when the Arab Spring
erupted in 2011, tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia spilled over
into competition for influence in Syria and Iraq, creating a proxy war
dynamic. The United States further reinforced this tension by treating
Saudi Arabia as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions.22
A change in US strategy towards working constructively at the
regional level, the deft use of diplomacy, and the possibility of a thaw in
relations with Iran, could have a positive effect on relationships between
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, something that could directly
defuse the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and help beat back ISIS.
19      Ruth Sherlock and Richard Spencer, “Syria Crisis: Support for Assad Starting to Fade as
Allies become Disillusioned by Setbacks,” The Telegraph, September 14, 2014.
20      Anne Gearan, “Egypt and UAE strike Islamist Militias in Libya,” The Washington Post, August
25, 2014.
21      Ross Harrison and Shahrokh Fardoust, “Time for a U.S. Regional Strategy for the Middle
East,” The National Interest, May 25, 2014, where we discuss the prospects and challenges of a regional
approach to the Middle East.
22      Ibid.

46

Parameters 44(3) Autumn 2014

Conclusion

The President’s strategy for destroying ISIS contains many of
the pillars needed for success. It involves air attacks on key positions,
protection of forces arrayed against ISIS on the ground, humanitarian
assistance, and a broad based counterterrorism coalition.23 But if we
think of ISIS as an insurgency movement, in addition to being a terrorist group, it becomes apparent we need more than military responses.
Political and diplomatic strategies will also be necessary, and will need
to operate at different levels. The first is working with individual Arab
states particularly susceptible to penetration by ISIS on their political and
military responses to this insurgency. The second is working diplomatically at the regional level, trying to collaborate with the major powers
which, while once may have been a big part of the problem, now seem
to be a key part of the solution. This task will be a difficult, though not
insuperable. The civil wars in Syria and Iraq, and the emergence of the
marauding and destructive ISIS has for now created a convergence of
interests, which while possibly ephemeral, is nonetheless unprecedented.
To prevent this opportunity from passing, the United States must
push back ISIS militarily. But it also needs to rally Arab support for
taking political ownership of an insurgency threatening the regional
order. It must also develop a regional framework to build cooperation
towards the eradication of ISIS.

23      Statement by the President on ISIL, Office of the White House Press Secretary, September
10, 2014.

